Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told the Senate Appropriations Committee on Tuesday that the Trump administration already possesses the constitutional authority to restart military operations against Iran, no vote from Congress required.
The assertion came during a hearing on the War Department's $1.5 trillion budget request for fiscal year 2027, and it landed squarely in the middle of a growing standoff between the executive branch and lawmakers over who controls the next chapter of the Iran conflict.
Hegseth's position is straightforward: the president's Article II powers as commander-in-chief are sufficient. But the War Powers Resolution of 1973 was written precisely to check that kind of claim, and several senators, Republican and Democrat alike, are pressing the point.
What Hegseth said, and what the law says
Responding to questions from Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, who has pushed for a formal congressional vote authorizing military force against Iran, Hegseth told the committee:
"Our view is should the president make the decision to recommence that we would have all the authorities necessary to do so."
He went further when pressed on the legal basis, stating plainly: "Our view is he has all the authority he needs under Article II to execute."
The War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973 to limit a president's ability to wage war without legislative sign-off, requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. forces into hostilities. It bars those forces from remaining engaged for more than 60 days without congressional authorization and allows only a 30-day extension for safe troop withdrawal.
The joint U.S.-Israeli operation against Iran's political leadership and military infrastructure began February 28. Trump did not notify Congress until March 2, setting the 60-day deadline at May 1.
A ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran began April 7. Trump notified Congress on May 1 that hostilities had ended.
The ceasefire loophole
Here is where the administration's legal theory gets creative. Last month, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hegseth argued that the ceasefire paused or stopped the 60-day War Powers clock. On Tuesday he repeated the claim.
"However, we are in a ceasefire right now, which our understanding means the 60-day clock pauses or stops in a ceasefire."
There is a problem with that reading. The War Powers Resolution contains no provision allowing the 60-day clock to pause during a ceasefire. The statute is silent on the matter. That silence does not equal permission, it means Congress never contemplated or endorsed such a mechanism.
Hegseth himself acknowledged the limits of his lane, telling senators: "On Iran, ultimately I would defer to the White House [and] White House counsel on that." The legal argument, in other words, is being built elsewhere. Hegseth is delivering the conclusion.
That pattern, making bold assertions at the podium while keeping the detailed rationale off-stage, has become a recurring feature of Hegseth's congressional appearances.
A ceasefire on "life support"
None of this would matter much if the ceasefire were holding. It is not.
On Monday, Trump said the ceasefire was on "life support" and expressed dissatisfaction with Tehran's latest peace proposal. Reports of attacks in the Strait of Hormuz have added to the tension. The administration appears to be laying the legal and political groundwork for a resumption of hostilities, and doing so on its own terms, without waiting for Congress to weigh in.
The Pentagon has already disclosed that the two-month-long Operation Epic Fury cost an estimated $25 billion, mostly for munitions, as the New York Post reported in late April. That price tag alone has drawn scrutiny from both parties.
Hegseth has not shied from the fight. Before the House Armed Services Committee, he accused congressional Democrats and some Republicans of undermining the war effort, calling their rhetoric "reckless, feckless, and defeatist." He framed the conflict in existential terms: "We are two months in on an existential fight for the safety of the American people. Iran cannot have a nuclear bomb."
That framing, Iran as a nuclear-threshold threat requiring decisive action, is the administration's strongest card. And it is not wrong. Iran's nuclear ambitions have been a bipartisan concern for decades. The House recently voted overwhelmingly to reaffirm Iran as the world's top state sponsor of terrorism, though 53 Democrats voted no, revealing the fractures on the left.
The real question Congress is ducking
Murkowski deserves credit for pressing the issue. An Authorization for Use of Military Force would give the president stronger legal footing, not weaker. It would also force every senator and representative to go on the record, something most of them would rather avoid.
That reluctance is the real story. Congress has spent decades ceding its war-making authority to the executive branch, then complaining about it afterward. The War Powers Resolution was supposed to be the guardrail. But presidents of both parties have treated it as a speed bump, and Congress has never had the collective will to enforce it.
Hegseth's assertion that Article II is enough is not new constitutional theory. It is the same argument every administration makes when it wants to act fast and deal with the legislature later. The question is whether this Congress, with a fragile ceasefire crumbling and a $25 billion tab already on the books, will do anything about it.
Hegseth has already shown he is willing to make large, unilateral moves on defense posture, from troop withdrawals in Europe to internal Pentagon shakeups. The Iran question is simply the highest-stakes version of the same pattern.
And the pattern works, politically, at least, as long as Congress lets it. Senators can hold hearings, ask pointed questions, and express concern. But until they actually vote, the executive branch holds the field by default.
Hegseth has made clear he intends to reshape the Pentagon's culture and chain of command on his own terms. His testimony Tuesday was consistent with that posture: the administration will act, and Congress can catch up when it's ready.
What comes next
The open questions are significant. What exactly did Tehran propose that Trump found unacceptable? What were the reported attacks in the Strait of Hormuz? And if the ceasefire collapses entirely, how quickly would the administration move, and on what specific legal authority beyond a general Article II claim?
Hegseth's deference to White House counsel suggests the detailed legal memo either exists and hasn't been shared with Congress, or hasn't been written yet. Neither answer is reassuring for lawmakers who believe the Constitution gives them a role in deciding when America goes to war.
The administration's position is not indefensible. A president facing an active nuclear threat from a state sponsor of terrorism has a strong case for acting decisively. But "strong case" and "settled law" are not the same thing, and the War Powers Resolution exists precisely because the Founders did not intend for one person to make that call alone.
If Congress wants a say, it knows where the voting buttons are. The question has never been whether the Constitution gives legislators the authority to act. It's whether they have the courage to use it.
