Three Silicon Valley engineers, all Iranian nationals, have been charged after allegedly attempting to sell Google's trade secrets to Iran. Samaneh Ghandali, her sister Soroor Ghandali, and Mohammadjavad Khosravi reportedly intended to use their positions at large tech firms to gain access to files containing information on processor security and cryptography, then funnel that knowledge back to Tehran.
All three were in the United States legally. Samaneh Ghandali had obtained naturalized citizenship. Soroor Ghandali held a student visa. Khosravi had obtained permanent resident status. Prosecutors also claim that Khosravi served in the Iranian military.
Google managed to discover the theft of materials during routine security checks. The company says it moved quickly once the breach surfaced. Google spokesman José Castañeda told Fox Business:
"We have enhanced safeguards to protect our confidential information and immediately alerted law enforcement after discovering this incident."
According to Townhall, Castañeda added that the indictments represent "an important step towards accountability" and that Google will "continue working to ensure our trade secrets remain secure."
The Charges and What They Carry
The penalties on the table are serious. Conspiracy to commit trade secrets theft alone carries up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. Obstruction charges tack on an additional 20 years and a further $250,000 fine. These are not slaps on the wrist.
The specific court, jurisdiction, and statute details have not been made public in available reporting, but the indictments themselves signal that federal prosecutors believe they have enough to move forward aggressively.
Legal Entry, Illegal Intent
Here is what makes this case especially instructive. None of these defendants snuck across the border. They came through proper channels: citizenship, a student visa, and permanent residency. They cleared the legal gates, took positions at one of the most powerful technology companies on earth, and allegedly used that access to betray the country that let them in.
This is the kind of threat that doesn't get enough attention. The national conversation about immigration tends to focus, rightly, on the crisis at the southern border. But espionage rarely arrives on a raft. It arrives with credentials. It arrives with a degree and a badge and a desk inside the building you're trying to protect.
The vetting debate in this country has always been about more than who crosses the border. It's about who gets access once they're inside. Processor security and cryptography are not abstract academic subjects. They sit at the core of America's technological edge, the infrastructure that powers everything from financial systems to national defense. Handing that to a hostile foreign government is not a white-collar crime. It is a national security breach.
Iran's Shadow Reach
The timing of these indictments lands against a tense backdrop. Tensions between Iran and the United States have rapidly increased, with a second carrier group now in the region and the possibility of further escalation hanging in the air.
Tehran has long pursued technological capabilities it cannot develop domestically, and stolen intellectual property is a shortcut the regime has shown no hesitation in exploiting. The alleged involvement of a former Iranian military member in this scheme fits a well-established pattern: Iran leverages its diaspora, willingly or otherwise, to acquire what sanctions and its own limitations deny it.
Silicon Valley has been slow to reckon with this reality. The industry's culture prizes openness, global talent pipelines, and a studied indifference to national origin. Those are admirable instincts in peacetime. They become vulnerabilities when a regime with declared hostility toward the United States plants operatives inside the companies building America's most sensitive technology.
What Comes Next
Google, to its credit, caught this through routine security checks rather than an outside tip. That matters. But one successful detection doesn't answer the harder question: how many go undetected?
The broader lesson here extends well beyond one company. Every major tech firm handling sensitive research faces the same exposure. The federal government and the private sector need a far more serious framework for identifying insider threats, particularly from nationals of adversarial states who hold sensitive roles. That is not xenophobia. It is common sense applied to national security.
Three people trusted with access to some of America's most valuable technological secrets allegedly tried to sell them to a hostile regime. They didn't hack in from overseas. They walked through the front door.
