Boeing has identified roughly 300 microscopic cracks on each of the two 747-8 jets being converted into the next Air Force One fleet, and the repair work, combined with more than $3 billion in cost overruns, has pushed delivery nearly four years past the original deadline.
The Air Force reported that as of late July, the first aircraft still had 21 stringer repairs or installations remaining out of approximately 300 identified cracks. The second aircraft was further behind, with only 104 of its 300 cracked structural members replaced. Stringers are reinforcing parts that run along the fuselage and help the airframe hold its shape under pressure. The cracks stem from corrosion-caused microscopic stress that has surfaced across the broader 747-8 fleet, not just the two presidential planes, and the FAA has mandated inspections and repairs at set intervals for all affected aircraft.
The Air Force said Boeing's progress on the stringer repairs does not currently pose a significant schedule risk. But that assessment comes against a backdrop of ballooning losses, missed deadlines, and supplier problems that have turned one of the most visible defense contracts in the country into a case study in cost overruns and accountability gaps.
A $3.9 billion contract that has already cost Boeing $3.13 billion in losses
Boeing signed a fixed-price contract in 2018 to convert two out-of-production 747-8 airframes into VC-25B presidential aircraft. Under a fixed-price deal, the contractor, not the taxpayer, absorbs costs that exceed the agreed amount. Boeing has now absorbed approximately $3.13 billion in accumulated charges on the program, Simple Flying reported, citing Bloomberg's original reporting.
The latest blow landed in July, when Boeing announced an additional $280 million charge tied to extra engineering and quality personnel and certification-related investment. The New York Post reported that Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg disclosed the charge during an earnings call, with total overruns now exceeding $3 billion on the $3.9 billion contract.
That means Boeing has eaten nearly the entire value of the contract in losses, and the planes still are not finished.
Boeing recorded a $1.4 billion charge on the program in 2022 alone, according to Bloomberg. The company began modifying the first aircraft in February 2020 and the second in June 2020. The original delivery date was December 2024. Both planes missed it.
The Air Force now expects the first aircraft in mid-2028 and, per the New York Post's reporting, the second in mid-2029, pushing the program nearly four years behind schedule on the first jet and roughly five on the second.
The fixed-price structure means taxpayers are shielded from the direct financial hit. But the delays carry costs of their own. The current Air Force One fleet, a pair of aging VC-25A aircraft based on the Boeing 747-200, continues flying well past its expected service life. The president recently swapped aircraft at a NATO summit amid questions about defense systems, a reminder that the aging fleet creates real operational headaches.
Supplier failures on windows and windshields add fresh schedule risk
Cracked stringers are not the only problem. The Air Force program office flagged supplier performance on passenger windows and cockpit windshields as schedule risks. Unnamed suppliers have struggled to meet required specifications, and a commercial spare windshield drawing still needs certification, a step that has not yet been completed.
The Air Force stated that Boeing has implemented multiple solutions intended to reduce schedule risk while continuing the structural repair work. But the service did not detail what those solutions are, and the identity of the underperforming suppliers remains undisclosed.
The pattern is familiar. Boeing's defense division has faced scrutiny across multiple programs for cost discipline failures and production quality issues. The Air Force One program, because of its visibility, draws the sharpest public attention, but the underlying dynamic is one that defense procurement watchers have tracked for years: fixed-price contracts on complex, one-of-a-kind military conversions that spiral when assumptions prove wrong.
The VC-25B program has already been the subject of extensive reporting. Boeing's cost overruns topping $3 billion have made the program one of the most expensive cautionary tales in recent defense contracting history.
Ortberg frames the $280 million hit as an investment in meeting the 2028 deadline
Boeing CEO Kelly Ortberg addressed the latest charge during the company's earnings call, framing the additional spending as a commitment to the customer rather than a concession of failure. The New York Post quoted Ortberg:
"While the charge is disappointing, we recognize how critical schedule performance is to our customer and we are investing accordingly to maintain our commitment to deliver the airplane in 2028."
That language, "investing accordingly", describes a company pouring more money into a program where it has already lost more than $3 billion. Whether the investment produces an on-time delivery in mid-2028 remains an open question. The Air Force's own assessment identifies active schedule risks beyond the stringer repairs, and the program has missed every prior deadline it has set.
Security concerns around presidential aircraft have not paused while Boeing works through its production problems. In a separate incident, the Secret Service evacuated President Trump from Air Force One using a catering truck after an Iranian missile threat, a vivid illustration of the operational stakes attached to presidential transport.
And the risks extend beyond the fixed-wing fleet. An NTSB investigation found that the Marine One crew could not reach air traffic control before a near-miss with a passenger jet, underscoring that presidential aviation safety depends on systems and infrastructure, not just airframes.
Six years of modifications, and neither jet has flown
Boeing has been working on these two aircraft for more than six years. Neither has flown. The conversion from a commercial 747-8 into a presidential aircraft involves far more than a paint job, the planes require hardened communications systems, defensive countermeasures, secure compartments, and the ability to serve as an airborne command post. But six years of work, $3.13 billion in losses, and a delivery date that keeps sliding raise a straightforward question: what went wrong, and who is accountable?
The corrosion-related stringer cracks were not a Boeing design flaw specific to the presidential aircraft. They appeared across the wider 747-8 fleet, and the FAA mandated the fix industry-wide. But the cracks added repair work to a program that was already behind schedule and hemorrhaging money. Finding 300 cracks per airframe on planes being converted into the most important aircraft in the U.S. government fleet does not inspire confidence in the condition of the raw materials Boeing started with.
The 2018 contract was a fixed-price deal, which in theory protects the government from exactly this kind of overrun. Boeing bears the financial pain. But the government bears the operational cost of flying decades-old aircraft past their intended retirement, and American taxpayers bear the broader cost of a defense industrial base where marquee programs routinely blow through schedules and budgets.
No contractual action by the government, cure notices, modifications, or penalties, has been publicly disclosed in connection with the delays. Whether the Air Force has exercised any contractual leverage behind the scenes remains unknown.
A fixed-price contract is supposed to be the taxpayer's best friend. But when the contractor loses $3 billion and still cannot deliver, the contract structure starts to look less like fiscal discipline and more like a mechanism that lets everyone avoid answering the hard questions until the planes finally show up, or don't.
